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Optimal Auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing:
Beyond Linear Utility
Yiding Feng∗ Jason D. Hartline† Yingkai Li‡
Abstract
The revenue optimal mechanism for selling a single item to agents with independent
but non-identically distributed values is complex for agents with linear utility (Myerson,
1981) and has no closed-form characterization for agents with non-linear utility (cf.
Alaei et al., 2012). Nonetheless, for linear utility agents satisfying a natural regularity
property, Alaei et al. (2018) showed that simply posting an anonymous price is an e-
approximation. We give a parameterization of the regularity property that extends to
agents with non-linear utility and show that the approximation bound of anonymous
pricing for regular agents approximately extends to agents that satisfy this approximate
regularity property. We apply this approximation framework to prove that anonymous
pricing is a constant approximation to the revenue optimal single-item auction for
agents with public-budget utility, private-budget utility, and (a special case of) risk-
averse utility.
1 Introduction
In Bayesian mechanism design, a central question “simple versus optimal” focuses on how
well simple mechanisms can approximate the revenue of the optimal mechanism in complex
environments. The main motivation comes from the fact that the optimal mechanisms for
asymmetric agents are usually both difficult to derive and implement. For agents with linear
utility, Myerson (1981) characterized the optimal mechanism; it is sophisticated and involves
discrimination. For more general models (e.g., budgeted agents, risk-averse agents), either
no closed form characterization is known in the literature, or the optimal mechanisms take
the model too literally and are both fragile and impractical. On the other hand, some
simple mechanisms (e.g., posting an anonymous price, second-price auction with anonymous
reserve) are prevalent broadly.
Alaei et al. (2018) study the simplest mechanism for asymmetric agents with linear utility,
namely, an anonymous pricing where an anonymous price is posted for selling a single good,
and the first agent (in an arbitrary order) who values the good at higher price will buy the
∗Department of Computer Science, Northwestern University. Email:
yidingfeng2021@u.northwestern.edu.
†Department of Computer Science, Northwestern University. Email: hartline@northwestern.edu.
‡Department of Computer Science, Northwestern University. Email: yingkai.li@u.northwestern.edu.
1
good. They upper bound the optimal revenue by considering the ex ante relaxation which
sell at most one item in expectation over randomness of all agents’ values, i.e., the ex post
feasibility constraint of selling at most one item is relaxed to that of selling at most one item
ex ante. They derive a tight e-approximation bound for the anonymous pricing to the ex ante
relaxation for independent but non-identical agents with linear utility and regular valuation
distributions (see below). Their result implies that, up to an e factor, discrimination and
simultaneity are unimportant for optimizing revenue in single-item auctions. A natural
question motivating our work is
Does the approximate optimality of anonymous pricing generalize to agents with
non-linear utility under a suitable generalization of the regularity assumption?
Regularity is a common assumption in mechanism design that simplifies the derivation of
the optimal mechanism (Myerson, 1981) and enables approximation mechanisms for agents
with linear utility (e.g., Hartline and Roughgarden, 2009). Fixing any class of mechanisms
and a single agent, the revenue curve is a mapping from a constraint q on the ex ante
probability of sale, over randomness in the agent’s type and the mechanism, to the revenue
of the optimal mechanism with the ex ante constraint. Specifically, the price-posting revenue
curve is generated by fixing mechanism class to all price-posting mechanisms; and the ex
ante revenue curve is by fixing mechanism class to all possible mechanisms. The regularity
for linear utility is defined as the equivalence of the price-posting revenue curve and the ex
ante revenue curve (cf. Bulow and Roberts, 1989). These two revenue curves are sufficient
to pin down the revenue from anonymous pricing, and ex ante relaxation, respectively.
Following the perspective of Alaei et al. (2013), the methods of our paper can be viewed as
reductions in the following two senses. First, we approximately reduce the analysis of revenue
of anonymous pricings for non-linear-utility agents to the analysis of revenue of anonymous
pricings for linear-utility agents. Thus, relative to anonymous pricings, non-linear agent
models can be considered well approximated by linear agent models. Second, our analysis
reduces the multi-agent question of approximation by an anonymous price to a collection
of single-agent approximation questions. These single-agent approximation questions ask
whether or not the price-posting revenue curve is a good approximation to the ex ante
revenue curve. Relative to Alaei et al. (2013), the single-agent problem to which we reduce
gives simpler mechanisms.
Main Results. We introduce a generalization of regularity that characterizes the gap
between the price-posting revenue curve and the ex ante revenue curve. Based on this
generalization, we give a reduction framework to approximately reduce the analysis of the
approximation bound for anonymous pricing for agents with non-linear utility to that of
agents with linear utility. As the instantiations of the framework, we analyze the approxi-
mation bound for the anonymous pricing for asymmetric agents with public-budget utility,
private-budget utility, and (a special case of) risk-averse utility, respectively.
Public-budget Utility: The first classical non-linear utility model we consider is agents
with public but non-identical budgets. For asymmetric agents with arbitrary distributions,
the optimal mechanism can be solved by a polynomial-time solvable linear program over
interim allocation rules (cf. Alaei et al., 2012; Che et al., 2013), but no closed-form char-
acterization is known. With the characterization of the optimal mechanism under ex ante
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public budget independent private budget risk averse
regular,
decreasing
density
regular
value regular,
budget MHR
value regular,
budget exceeds
expectation w.p.
at least 1/κ
regular, support [0, v¯i],
capacity at least v¯i/η
approx
ratio
e 2e 3e
√
2(2 + κ)(1 + κ)e (2 + ln η)e
Table 1: Approximation bounds for anonymous pricing with asymmetric agents
constraints in Alaei et al. (2013), and a generalization of an argument from Abrams (2006),
our framework yields 2e-approximation and e-approximation bounds, assuming the valuation
distributions are regular and regular with decreasing density, respectively (Theorem 4.1).
Private-budget Utility: Mechanism design for agents with private-budget utility is chal-
lenging because the agent types are multi-dimensional. A lot of work has focused on char-
acterizing the optimal mechanism and approximation mechanisms in this setting (discussed
subsequently). Our framework shows that with independent value and budget distribu-
tions, regular value distributions, and with some assumptions on the budget distribution
that anonymous pricing is a constant approximation to the optimal revenue (Theorem 5.4,
Theorem 5.12), e.g., for monotone hazard rate budget distributions anonymous pricing is a
3e approximation.
Risk-averse utility: It is standard to model risk-averse utility as a concave function that
maps agents’ wealth to a utility. This introduces a non-linearity into the incentive constraints
of the agents which in most cases makes mechanism design analytically intractable. Most re-
sults for agents with risk-averse utility consider the comparative performance of the first- and
second-price auctions, cf., Riley and Samuelson (1981), Holt Jr (1980), Maskin and Riley
(1984). Matthews (1983) and Maskin and Riley (1984), however, characterize optimal mech-
anisms for symmetric agents for constant absolute risk aversion and more general risk-averse
model. In this paper, we restrict attention to very specific form of risk aversion studied in
Fu et al. (2013), which is called capacitated utility. We derive a constant approximation
bound (Theorem 6.3) for anonymous pricing for asymmetric agents, under an assumption
on the capacities.
All the approximation bounds and the corresponding assumptions can be found in Table 1.
In each section, we also provide examples showing that without the assumptions we make,
the constant approximation for anonymous pricing cannot be guaranteed.
Related Work. A prominent line of research has studied anonymous pricing in single-
item environment for agents with linear utility. Hartline and Roughgarden (2009) show
that second-price auction with an anonymous reserve is a 4-approximation to the optimal
revenue. Alaei et al. (2018) improve this result by showing that anonymous pricing is a tight
e-approximation to the optimal ex ante relaxation. Jin et al. (2019b) prove that the tight
ratio between anonymous pricing and the optimal (discriminatory) sequential post pricing is
2.62, and Jin et al. (2019a) show that the same tight ratio holds between anonymous pricing
and the optimal mechanism.
One of the main contributions in our paper is to show that anonymous pricing is a con-
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stant approximation for asymmetric agents with private budgets. There are several papers
in the literature that consider similar anonymous-pricing problems but with no unit-demand
constraint on agents. Abrams (2006) shows that market clearing (the anonymous pricing
where demand meets supply) gives a two approximation to the revenue of the optimal mech-
anism for selling multiple units to a set of asymmetric agents with public values and public
budgets. Richter (2016) show that under the assumption that the valuation distribution is
regular with decreasing density, a price-posting mechanism is optimal for selling a divisible
good to a continuum of agents with private budgets. The lack of a unit-demand constraint
on agents is crucial for their analyses and its introduction poses significant challenges for
ours.
In the single item environment, for a single agent with private budget constraint, when
her valuation distribution satisfies declining marginal revenues, 1 Che and Gale (2000) char-
acterize the optimal mechanism by a differential equation. Devanur and Weinberg (2017)
characterize the optimal mechanism for a single agent with an arbitrary distribution by a
linear program and use an algorithmic approach to construct the solution. For multi-agents
settings, Laffont and Robert (1996) show that the all-pay auction is optimal for symmetric
agents in the public budget setting when the valuation distribution is regular and decreasing
density. Pai and Vohra (2014) generalize the characterization of the optimal mechanism for
symmetric agents in the private budget setting, with budgets distributed uniformly.
For more general feasibility constraints and private budgets, Chawla et al. (2011) show
that when the feasible allocations form a matroid and the valuation distribution is monotone
hazard rate (MHR), a simple lottery mechanism is a constant approximation to the optimal
pointwise individually rational mechanism. 2 Note that, via an example in Chawla et al.
(2011), there can be a linear gap in revenue between the optimal pointwise individually
rational mechanism and the optimal interim individually rational mechanism. Under the
more classical interim individual rationality constraint, Alaei et al. (2012) reduce the multi-
agent problem to the single-agent interim optimization problem, and solve it via a convex
program. Alaei et al. (2013) approximately reduce the multi-agent problem to the single-
agent ex ante optimization problem, and show, for example, that in the special case of the
single item environment, (discriminatorally and) sequentially posting the single agent ex ante
optimal mechanisms gives an e/(e− 1)-approximation. In comparison with these reduction
results, the advantage of our approach is that while the ex ante optimal mechanisms are
used in our bound, the approximately optimal mechanisms we identify are based only on
single-agent posted pricing and are, thus, much simpler. Moreover, our resulting simple
mechanisms can be optimized over directly.
2 Preliminaries
We consider the single item environment from auction theory. A seller has a single indivisible
good. Agents have private types drawn independently, but not necessarily identically from
1The decreasing marginal revenue assumption considers revenue as a function of price and requires its
derivative be decreasing.
2 The pointwise individually rational mechanism requires that the payment of the agent is at most her
value of the allocation after the realization of the randomness of the mechanism.
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some distributions. We are interested in optimizing the revenue, namely the sum of payments
made by agents, of a mechanism for selling the good.
Auction Instance. An auction instance is defined as I = (N,T ,D,u). Here N is the set
of agents and n = |N | is the number of agents. T = ×i∈NTi,D = ×i∈NDi, and u = ×i∈Nui
are the type space, distributions and utility functions for each agent. In this paper, agents
are non-identical, and the outcome for an agent i is the distribution over the pair (xi, pi),
where allocation xi ∈ {0, 1} and payment pi ∈ R+. The utility function of each player ui is
a mapping from her private type and the outcome to her von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
for the outcome.
Type structures and utility functions. The general framework of the paper will be
instantiated in four specific models.
1. Linear utility: A private type t is a private value v ∈ [0, v¯] of the good. We denote the
cumulative distribution function and the density function for the valuation distribution
by F and f respectively. Given allocation x and payment p, an agent’s utility is vx−p.
Our development of the approximation bound for anonymous pricing is based on a
reduction from general utility function environments to linear utility environments.
2. Public-budget utility: A private type t is a private value v ∈ [0, v¯]. The utility
function u also encodes a public budget w ∈ R+, which is not necessarily identical
across agents. Given allocation x and payment p, an agent has utility vx − p if the
payment p is at most the budget w and utility −∞ otherwise.
3. Private-budget utility: A private type t is a pair (v, w) that consists of a private
value v ∈ [0, v¯] and a private budget w ∈ [
¯
w, w¯]. We denote the cumulative distribution
function and the density function for the budget distribution by G and g respectively.
Given allocation x and payment p, her utility is vx− p if the payment p is at most the
budget w and is −∞ otherwise.
4. Risk-averse utility: A private type t is a private value v ∈ [0, v¯] of the good. The
utility function u is a concave function mapping from the wealth of an agent to a
utility. Specifically, we restrict attention to a very specific form of risk aversion studied
in Fu et al. (2013), which is both computationally and analytically tractable: utility
functions that are linear up to a given capacity C and then flat. Given allocation x
and payment p, an agent has utility min{vx− p, C}. We refer to this utility function
as capacitated utility. The capacity C is encoded in the utility function and is not
necessarily identical across agents.
The assumption that the supports of the distributions are bounded intervals in the models
above is for technical simplicity and is without loss of generality.
Ex ante revenue curves and price-posting revenue curves. We introduce the quan-
tile space, ex ante revenue curves and price-posting revenue curves.
5
Definition 2.1. The quantile q of a single-dimensional agent with value v drawn from
distribution F is the measure with respect to F of stronger values, i.e., q = 1 − F (v); the
inverse demand function V maps an agent’s quantile to her value, i.e., V (q) = F−1(1− q).
Definition 2.2. Given ex ante constraint q, the single-agent ex ante revenue-maximization
problem is to find the optimal mechanism with ex ante allocation probability (i.e. the expected
allocation over the draws of the agent’s type) exactly q. The optimal ex ante revenue, as a
function of q, is denoted by the ex ante revenue curve R(q).
Since the revenue (i.e., expected payment) is a linear objective, and the space of feasible
mechanisms is convex, the ex ante revenue curve is concave.
Fact 2.1. The ex ante revenue curve is concave.
Definition 2.3. A per-unit price p : [0, 1] → R+ for selling an indivisible good probabilis-
tically is a mapping from a lottery with winning probability x† to a payment p† = p · x†.
Per-unit pricing for a single agent is a mechanism where a per-unit price p is posted, and
the agent can select a lottery with an arbitrary winning probability x† and pay p · x†. The
item remains unsold with probability 1− x†.
Definition 2.4. Given ex ante constraint q, the single-agent ex ante price-posting problem
is to find the per-unit pricing with ex ante allocation probability exactly q. The optimal ex
ante price-posting revenue, as a function of q, is denoted by the price-posting revenue curve
P (q). The market clearing price pq for the ex ante constraint q is pq = P (q)/q.
For an agent with linear utility, the price-posting revenue curve P (q) at any quantile q is
achieved by posting per-unit price V (q), i.e., P (q) = qV (q); and Bulow and Roberts (1989)
give a geometric connection between the ex ante revenue curve and price-posting revenue
curve.
Lemma 2.2 (Bulow and Roberts, 1989). For an agent with linear utility, the ex ante revenue
curve R is equal to the concave hull of the price-posting revenue curve P .
For agents with linear utility, an agent’s valuation distribution is regular if the price-
posting revenue curve is concave; equivalently, if the price posting and ex ante revenue
curves are identical, i.e., R = P . The price that maximizes the revenue from a single agent
is called monopoly reserve m∗. Lemma 2.2 implies that the ex ante optimal mechanisms for
a single agent with linear utility, is either a price posting or the randomization over two price
postings. For general utility agents, the ex ante revenue curve can be much larger than the
price-posting revenue curve almost everywhere (Example A.2).
It is straightforward to map per-unit price to quantile with the price-posting revenue
curve, i.e., Q(p, P ) = argmax{q : P (q) = qp}. In this paper, it will be useful to imagine
that an ex ante revenue curve R is generated by per-unit pricing, even when it is not, and
mathematically define the mapping from effective price to quantile in the same way, i.e.,
Q(p, R) = argmax{q : R(q) = qp}. Equivalently, this definition imagines a regular linear-
utility agent with the same revenue curve R and for which Q(p, R) is the largest quantile
that accepts price p.
Definition 2.5. Effective price posting p to an ex ante revenue curve R is a mechanism
where a per-unit price p is posted to an agent with a price-posting revenue curve equivalent
to R.
6
Different mechanisms of interest in this paper. Through this paper, we focus on
optimal mechanisms in the following three classes.
1. Auctions: An auction is any mechanism that maps types to allocations and payments
subject to incentive and feasibility constraints. Under the linear utility assumption, the
optimal auction was characterized by Myerson (1981) and this characterization, though
complex, is the foundation of modern auction theory. For more general utility models
with asymmetric agents (e.g. public-budget utility, private-budget utility, risk-averse
utility), there is no closed form characterization in the literature.
2. Ex ante relaxations: The ex ante relaxation considers the problem of selling at most
one item in expectation over draws of all agents’ types, i.e., the ex post feasibility con-
straint of selling at most one item is relaxed to that of selling at most one item ex ante.
Fixing the ex ante probability of serving each agent, the ex ante optimal mechanism
solves the single-agent ex ante revenue-maximization problem for all agents individu-
ally. The ex ante optimal mechanism for asymmetric agents usually discriminates and
may, ex post, simultaneously serve multiple agents. This relaxation was identified as a
quantity of interest in Chawla et al. (2007) and its study was refined by Alaei (2011)
and Yan (2011). The revenue of the ex ante optimal mechanism gives an upper bound
on the revenue of the (point-wise feasible) optimal auction, see e.g., Alaei (2011). We
denote the optimal revenue achieved by the ex ante relaxation for a specific collection
of ex ante revenue curves {Ri}ni=1 by EAR({Ri}ni=1) = max
qi:
∑
qi≤1
∑
iRi(qi).
3. Anonymous pricings: An anonymous pricing mechanism posts an anonymous per-
unit price p and the agents arrive in an arbitrary order. Each agent can select a
lottery with an arbitrary winning probability x† and pay p · x†. The lottery executes
immediately before the next agent arrives. Once an agent wins the item, the mechanism
halts. We denote the revenue achieved by posting anonymous per-unit price p for a
specific collection of price-posting revenue curves {Pi}ni=1 by AP({Pi}ni=1, p). We denote
the revenue from the optimal anonymous price by AP({Pi}ni=1) = maxpAP({Pi}ni=1, p).
Consider an arbitrary agent i. Suppose all agents who come earlier than her do not win
the item. The probability that she wins the item is Q(p, Pi), where the randomness
comes from her own type and the lottery which she selects. Thus, AP({Pi}ni=1, p) =
p · (1−∏i(1−Q(p, Pi))).
Linear utility e-approximation bound. Alaei et al. (2018) show that anonymous pric-
ings give a tight e-approximation to ex ante relaxations for agents with regular valuation
distributions and linear utility. For regular linear agents, the price-posting revenue curves
are concave and equal to the ex ante revenue curves. Moreover, for any non-negative con-
cave function on domain [0, 1], there is a regular value distribution with this function as its
revenue curve. Thus, the result of Alaei et al. (2018) can be restated as follows.
Theorem 2.3 (Alaei et al., 2018). Any set {Ri}ni=1 of non-negative concave functions on
domain [0, 1] satisfies ρ ·AP({Ri}ni=1) ≥ EAR({Ri}ni=1) for ρ which numerically evaluates to
e ≈ 2.718; i.e., anonymous pricing is a ρ approximation to the ex ante relaxation for linear
utility agents with values drawn from regular distributions with these revenue curves.
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EAR({Pi}ni=1)
AP({Pi}ni=1)
EAR({Ri}ni=1)
AP({Ri}ni=1)
Thm. 3.4: ζ-approx,
if {Pi}ni=1 is ζ-close for ex ante
optimization to {Ri}ni=1.
Thm. 3.1: αβ-approx,
if {Pi}ni=1 is (α, β)-close for
price posting to {Ri}ni=1.
Thm. 2.3: ρ-approx,
if {Pi}ni=1 is concave. Thm. 2.3: ρ-approx.
Figure 1: The reduction framework. The upper path uses the approximate robustness of
anonymous pricing. A better bound for the upper path is obtained from Theorem 3.2 but
omitted from the figure. The lower path uses the approximate robustness of the ex ante
relaxation and requires that the price-posting revenue curves are concave.
3 A General Reduction Framework
In this section, we give two approaches that approximately reduce the approximation of
anonymous pricing for non-linear agents to the approximation of anonymous pricing for
linear agents. The first approach applies when a “closeness” condition between the price-
posting revenue curve and the ex ante revenue curve holds. The approximation guarantee
degrades with this closeness condition. The second approach applies under a much weaker
closeness condition but additionally requires that the price-posting revenue curve is concave.
The high-level steps of these reductions are depicted in Figure 1.
These reductions are based on the facts that the ex ante revenue is given mathematically
by the ex ante revenue curves {Ri}ni=1, the anonymous pricing revenue is given by the price-
posting revenue curves {Pi}ni=1, and the ρ approximation of anonymous pricing to the ex
ante relaxation for linear agents implies, as stated in Theorem 2.3, an approximation bound
between anonymous pricing AP(·) and the ex ante relaxation EAR(·) for any set of concave
revenue curves.
3.1 Approximate Robustness of Anonymous Pricing
We develop the upper path of Figure 1 for reducing non-linear anonymous pricing problem
to the linear anonymous pricing problem. This upper path is based on identifying a close-
ness property on revenue curves that approximately preserves anonymous pricing revenue.
This closeness property, illustrated in the left hand side of Figure 2, can be viewed as an
approximate notion of regularity.
Definition 3.1. The agent’s price-posting revenue curve P is (α, β)-close for price posting
to her ex ante revenue curve R, if P (q) ≥ 1
α
R(q) for all q ∈ [0, 1/β]. Such an agent is
(α, β)-close for price posting.
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0 1/β 1
R
P
R/α
0 1
R
P
P ′
R/ζ
Figure 2: The left hand side illustrates an example that the price-posting revenue curve P
is (α, β)-close for price posting to ex ante revenue curve R. The definition requires that P
is at least R/α on [0, 1/β], i.e., that the black thin line is above the black dotted line. The
right hand side illustrates an example that the price-posting revenue curve P is ζ-close for
ex ante optimization to ex ante revenue curve R. Depicted with the gray dashed line, P ′ is
defined as P ′(q) = maxq′≤q P (q) and ζ-closeness requires that P ′ > R/ζ , i.e., that the gray
dashed line is above the black dotted line.
Theorem 3.1. Given agents with ex ante revenue curves {Ri}ni=1 and price-posting revenue
curves {Pi}ni=1, if each agent i, is (α, β)-close for price posting, anonymous pricing on the
price posting revenue curve is an (αβ)-approximation to anonymous pricing on the ex ante
revenue curve, i.e., αβ · AP({Pi}ni=1) ≥ AP({Ri}ni=1).
Proof. Let pˆ be the anonymous price on ex ante revenue curve, and let the per-unit price
p† = pˆ
α
. For each agent i, let qˆi = Q(pˆ, Ri) and q
†
i = Q(
pˆ
α
, Pi). If the quantile qˆi ≤ 1β , since
Pi is (α, β)-close for price posting to Ri, Pi(qˆi) ≥ 1αRi(qˆi). Therefore, pˆi·qˆiα ≤ Pi(qˆi), which
implies q†i ≥ qˆi.
If qˆi >
1
β
, and if q†i ≥ 1β , then q†i ≥ qˆiβ . If q†i < 1β , (α, β)-closeness for price posting implies
that Ri(q
†
i ) ≤ αPi(q†i ) = α · pˆα · q†i , namely, pˆ · q†i ≥ Ri(q†i ) = pˆ · qˆi, which contradicts to the
assumption that qˆi >
1
β
≥ q†i .
Therefore, the revenue of posting price pˆ
α
on the price posting revenue curve is
AP
(
{Pi}ni=1,
pˆ
α
)
=
pˆ
α
·
(
1−
∏
i
(1− q†i )
)
≥ pˆ
α
·
(
1−
∏
i
(1− qˆi
β
)
)
≥ pˆ
αβ
·
(
1−
∏
i
(1− qˆi)
)
=
1
αβ
AP({Ri}ni=1, pˆ).
The bound in Theorem 3.1 can be improved if we have extra information about the
closeness between the price posting revenue curve and the ex ante revenue curve. Specifically,
let η denote a bound on the ratio between the single agent optimal mechanism and the single
agent optimal price posting, i.e., maxq R(q)/maxq P (q) ≤ η. It is easy to see that if P and
R are (α, β)-close then η ≤ αβ. Often, a better bound on η than αβ can be obtained and,
when it can, Theorem 3.2 improves the bound of Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.2. Given agents with ex ante revenue curves {Ri}ni=1 and price-posting revenue
curves {Pi}ni=1, if each agent is (α, β)-close for price posting and the optimal price posting
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revenue for each agent is an η-approximation to the optimal single agent revenue, then anony-
mous pricing on the price posting revenue curve is a max{α,√αβη}-approximation to anony-
mous pricing on the ex ante revenue curve, i.e., max{α,√αβη}·AP({Pi}ni=1) ≥ AP({Ri}ni=1).
Proof. Let pˆ be the anonymous price on ex ante revenue curve. For a threshold ̺ to be
tuned subsequently, we say an agent i is a significant contributor to the anonymous pricing
revenue AP({Ri}ni=1, pˆ) if Q(pˆ, Ri) is at least 1/̺ . We analyze separately the case that there
is a significant contributor and the case that all agents are insignificant contributors.
When Significant Contributor Exists. Suppose there exists an agent i∗ such that
Q(pˆ, Ri∗) is at least 1/̺ . Consider the optimal price-posting for this single agent i
∗. Its
revenue is a ̺ηγ-approximation to the ex ante relaxation, i.e.,
AP({Pi}ni=1) ≥ max
q
Pi∗(q) ≥ 1
η
max
q
Ri∗(q) ≥ 1
η̺
AP({Ri}ni=1, pˆ) (1)
where the first inequality is due to our η-approximation assumption for a single agent, and
the second inequality is due to the fact that agent i∗ is a significant contributor.
When Significant Contributor Does Not Exist. Suppose there is no significant con-
tributor, i.e., Q(pˆ, Ri) < 1/̺ for all i. By a similar argument to Theorem 3.1, we can lower
bound Q( pˆ
α
, Pi) for every agent i as follows,
Q
(
pˆ
α
, Pi
)
≥
{
Q(pˆ, Ri) if Q(pˆ, Ri) ≤ 1/β
̺
β
·Q(pˆ, Ri) otherwise
where the latter case uses the facts that Q
(
pˆ
α
, Pi
) ≥ 1/β and Q(pˆ, Ri) < 1/̺ .
Therefore, for parameter ̺ ≤ β, the the revenue of posting price pˆ
α
is
AP
(
{Pi}ni=1,
pˆ
α
)
=
pˆ
α
·
(
1−
∏
i
(1−Q( pˆ
α
, Pi))
)
≥ pˆ
α
·
(
1−
∏
i
(1− ̺
β
Q(pˆ, Ri))
)
≥ pˆ̺
αβ
·
(
1−
∏
i
(1−Q(pˆ, Ri))
)
=
̺
αβ
AP({Ri}ni=1, pˆ). (2)
Notice that the approximation bounds of equations (1) and (2) have ̺ in the denominator
and numerator, respectively. Thus, setting ̺ to equalize these bounds (when possible) will
optimize approximation bound. Specifically, if α ≤ βη, setting ̺ =
√
αβ/η optimizes the
approximation bound as
√
αβη; and if α > βη, setting ̺ = β optimizes the approximation
bound as α.
Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 reduce the approximation of anonymous pricing for non-
linear agents to that of regular linear agents. For example, if γ·AP({Ri}ni=1) ≥ EAR({Ri}ni=1),
Theorem 3.1 implies αβγ · AP({Pi}ni=1) ≥ EAR({Ri}ni=1). By Fact 2.1, the ex ante revenue
curves {Ri}ni=1 are concave and thus, by Theorem 2.3, the approximation ratio γ is at most
ρ ≈ e.
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Corollary 3.3. Given agents with ex ante revenue curves {Ri}ni=1 and price-posting rev-
enue curves {Pi}ni=1, if each agent is (α, β)-close for price posting, then the worst case
approximation factor of anonymous pricing to the ex ante relaxation is αβρ, i.e., αβρ ·
AP({Pi}ni=1) ≥ EAR({Ri}ni=1). If additionally, the optimal price posting revenue for each
agent is an η-approximation to the optimal single agent revenue, then the worst case ap-
proximation factor of anonymous pricing to the ex ante relaxation is max{α,√αβη} ·ρ, i.e.,
max{α,√αβη} · ρ · AP({Pi}ni=1) ≥ EAR({Ri}ni=1).
The reduction framework in Corollary 3.3 is tight with the given assumptions. See Ap-
pendix C for a lower bound instance.
3.2 Approximate Robustness of the Ex Ante Relaxation
We develop the lower path of Figure 1 for reducing the non-linear anonymous pricing problem
to the linear anonymous pricing problem. This lower path is based on identifying a closeness
property on revenue curves that approximately preserves the optimal revenue of the ex ante
relaxation. The revenue of ex ante relaxation is approximately preserved under weaker
conditions than the revenue of anonymous pricing. On the other hand, to make use of
this approximate robustness to derive an anonymous pricing approximation, our framework
additionally requires the assumption that non-linear agents’ price-posting revenue curves are
concave.
Definition 3.2. The agent’s price-posting revenue curve P is ζ-close for ex ante optimization
to her ex ante revenue curve R, if for all q ∈ [0, 1], there exists a quantile q† ≤ q such that
P (q†) ≥ 1
ζ
R(q). Such an agent is ζ-close for ex ante optimization.
The above definition is illustrated in the right hand side of Figure 2. Note that (α, β)-
close for price posting implies (αβ)-close for ex ante optimization.
Theorem 3.4. Given agents with ex ante revenue curves {Ri}ni=1 and price-posting revenue
curves {Pi}ni=1, if each agent i is ζ-close for ex ante optimization, then the optimal ex ante
relaxation on revenue curves {Pi}ni=1 is a ζ-approximation to the optimal ex ante relaxation
on revenue curves {Ri}ni=1, i.e., EAR({Pi}ni=1) ≥ 1ζEAR({Ri}ni=1).
Proof. Let {qi}ni=1 be the optimal ex ante relaxation for ex ante revenue curves {Ri}ni=1, and
let q†i be the quantile assumed to exist by ζ-closeness such that q
†
i ≤ qi and Pi(q†i ) ≥ 1ζRi(qi)
for each i. We have
EAR({Pi}ni=1) ≥
∑
i
Pi(q
†
i ) ≥
1
ζ
∑
i
R(qi) =
1
ζ
EAR({Ri}ni=1).
When the price posting revenue curves are concave, Theorem 3.4 can be combined with
Theorem 2.3 applied to {Pi}ni=1 to obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 3.5. Given agents with ex ante revenue curves {Ri}ni=1 and price-posting revenue
curves {Pi}ni=1, if each agent has concave price-posting revenue curve and is ζ-close for ex
ante optimization, then the worst case approximation factor of anonymous pricing to the ex
ante relaxation is ζρ, i.e., ζρ · AP({Pi}ni=1) ≥ EAR({Ri}ni=1).
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3.3 Heterogeneous Agent Utility Models
Our closeness definitions are monotonic, formalized in the subsequent lemma. With this
observation, our framework can be applied to environments with heterogeneous utility func-
tions. For example, suppose some of the agents have private budget constraints and some
of the agents are risk averse. If each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is (αi, βi)-close for price posting,
then anonymous pricing for these agents is a (max{αi} ·max{βi} · ρ)-approximation to the
optimal ex ante relaxation.
Lemma 3.6. For any α′ ≥ α ≥ 1, β ′ ≥ β ≥ 1, and ζ ′ ≥ ζ ≥ 1, (α, β)-close for price posting
implies (α′, β ′)-close for price posting, and ζ-closeness for ex ante optimization implies ζ ′-
close for ex ante optimization.
4 Public-budget Utility
In this section, we consider the case where agents have public-budget utility. We make
the following two standard assumptions on the valuation distributions. In the linear utility
model, Alaei et al. (2018) show that the regularity on valuation distribution is necessary
for the constant approximation bound of the anonymous pricing, so we make the same
assumption under the public-budget utility. We also consider an additional assumption
that the density function is decreasing on its support. These two assumptions together are
sometimes called public-budget regularity (cf. Pai and Vohra, 2014). The following theorem
and corollary summarize the main results of this section.
Theorem 4.1. An agent with public-budget utility and regular valuation distribution is (2, 1)-
close for price posting, and with regular and decreasing density valuation distribution the
agent is (1, 1)-close for price posting.
Corollary 4.2. For a single item environment with agents with public-budget utility and
regular valuation distributions, the worst case approximation factor of anonymous pricing to
the ex ante relaxation is at most 2ρ; with regular and decreasing density valuation distribu-
tions, the worst case approximation factor of anonymous pricing to the ex ante relaxation is
at most ρ.
To prove Theorem 4.1, we start with a characterization of the ex ante optimal mechanism
from Alaei et al. (2013).
Lemma 4.3 (Alaei et al., 2013). For a single agent with public-budget utility and regular
and decreasing density valuation distribution, the q ∈ [0, 1] ex ante optimal mechanism is a
per-unit pricing, i.e., R(q) = P (q).
Notice that the outcome of the optimal per-unit pricing of Lemma 4.3 is clear. If the
agent’s value is below the per-unit price, then she does not buy. If her value is above the
per-unit price then she buys until either the budget constraint binds or the unit-demand
constraint binds. Since the ex ante optimal mechanism is a per-unit pricing, the revenue
curves are equal R = P and the agent is (1, 1)-close for price posting. The second part of
Theorem 4.1 is completed, and the following lemma implies the first part.
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Lemma 4.4. For a single agent with public-budget utility and regular valuation distribution,
the q ∈ [0, 1] optimal price-posting revenue is a 2-approximation to the ex ante optimal
revenue, i.e., 2P (q) ≥ R(q).
Proof. Fix any ex ante constraint q. Let pq = P (q)/q be the market clearing price with ex
ante allocation exactly q. If pq is smaller than the budget (i.e. the budget constraint does not
bind), since the valuation distribution is regular, posting pq is optimal for ex ante constraint.
Consider the remaining case where the market clearing price pq is larger than the budget.
View the ex ante mechanism as a menu with quantity-price options (the taxation principle).
• Consider the options in the q ex ante optimal mechanism with per-unit price smaller
than pq. The total demand of these options is at most q and thus, at per-unit prices
below pq, the total revenue from these options is at most pq q = P (q).
• Consider the options in the q ex ante optimal mechanism with per-unit price larger
than pq. The types that buy these options all have value at least pq. The payment
from each of these types is at most their budget. Under the market clearing price pq all
of these types pay exactly their budget. Thus, the total revenue from market clearing
is at least the revenue from these options.
In conclusion the q ex ante optimal revenue is upper bounded by twice the q price posting
revenue.
The second part of the proof of Lemma 4.4 is similar to an analysis by Abrams (2006). In
contrast, her setting lacks the unit-demand constraint, which simplifies her argument since
an agent will pay her full budget even when the market clearing price is smaller than her
budget. In contrast, our analysis uses regularity when the unit-demand constraint binds.
5 Independent Private-budget Utility
In this section, we consider the case where agents have private-budget utility. To obtain a
constant approximation bound for anonymous pricing, we assume that values and budgets
are independently distributed, the valuation distribution is regular and one of two possi-
ble assumptions on the budget distribution: (a) the probability that the budget exceeds
its expectation is at least a constant 1/κ; and (b) the budget distribution has monotone
hazard rate (MHR), i.e, g(w)
1−G(w) is monotonically non-decreasing with respect to w. Since
for a MHR distribution, a sample exceeds its expectation with probability at least 1/e (cf.
Barlow and Marshall, 1965), assumption (b) is special case of assumption (a) with κ = e.
We give two examples in Appendix A that demonstrate the necessity of these assumptions
to guarantee the constant approximation of anonymous pricing.
5.1 Unconstrained 2-approximation
Before giving results about the closeness of ex ante revenue curves and price-posting revenue
curves, we first show that the optimal pricing is a 2-approximation to the optimal mechanism
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Figure 3: In the geometric proof of Lemma 5.3, for any fixed budget w the optimal revenue
is the area of the light gray striped rectangle and the revenue from posting random price pˆ is
the area of the dark gray region. By geometry, the latter is at least half of the former. The
black curve is the price-posting revenue curve with no budget constraint PL. The figure on
the left depicts the large-budget case (i.e., w ≥ m∗), and the figure on the right depicts the
small-budget case (i.e., w ≤ m∗).
(with no ex ante constraint). With this result we will be able to invoke Theorem 3.2 with
η = 2. Though it will not result in any improvements in our main results, this approximation
bound does not make any assumptions on the budget distribution.
Theorem 5.1. For selling a single item to a single private-budget agent with independent
value and budget distributions and regular value distribution, the optimal per-unit pricing is
a 2-approximation to the optimal mechanism.
We give the proof of this theorem below. It follows from a characterization of the optimal
revenue for public-budget agents from Laffont and Robert (1996) and a generalization of a
geometric argument from Dhangwatnotai et al. (2010) that analyzes the revenue from a
random price from the value distribution, both stated below. We employ this random-price
argument later in Lemma 5.14 as well.
Lemma 5.2 (Laffont and Robert, 1996). For a single item and single public-budget agent
with regular valuation distribution, the optimal mechanism posts a price equal to the smaller
of the agent’s budget and the monopoly reserve.
The following lemma generalizes a lemma and proof approach by Dhangwatnotai et al.
(2010) to public-budget agents.
Lemma 5.3. For a single item and a single public-budget agent with regular valuation dis-
tribution, posting a random per-unit price drawn from the valuation distribution is a 2-
approximation to the optimal revenue.
Proof. Denote the agent’s fixed budget by w and let pˆ be a random per-unit price drawn
from valuation distribution F . For the depiction of Figure 3, we claim that the dark grey
shaded area is the expected revenue of posting the random price pˆ, and the area of the light
grey striped rectangle is the optimal revenue. Concavity of the price-posting revenue curve
with no budget constraint (by regularity of the value distribution) implies that a triangle
with half the area of the light gray rectangle is contained within the dark gray region and,
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thus, the random price is a 2-approximation. The remainder of this proof shows that the
geometry of the regions described above is correct.
Let PL be the price-posting revenue curve with no budget constraint. When pˆ ≤ w, the
revenue of posting price pˆ is PL(1− F (pˆ)) and, when pˆ > w, the revenue of posting price pˆ
is w (1 − F (pˆ)). Let q∗ = max{1− F (w), 1− F (m∗)}. Lemma 5.2 implies that the optimal
revenue for budget w is PL(q∗) by posting the minimum between the monopoly reserve m∗
and the budget w, i.e., it is the area of the light gray striped rectangle. On the other hand,
the revenue of posting pˆ is
∫ 1−F (w)
0
w q dq +
∫ 1
1−F (w) P
L(q) dq, which is exactly the dark grey
shaded area.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Consider the revenue from types with each fixed budget level sepa-
rately. At each budget level, Lemma 5.3 guarantees that the revenue from posting a random
per-price is a 2-approximation to the optimal revenue from these types. Since value and
budget are independent, the random per-unit prices offered at all budget levels are iden-
tically distributed, thus simultaneously offering the same random per-unit price across all
budget levels guarantees a 2-approximation to optimal revenue for the private-budget agent.
Furthermore, the optimal deterministic per-unit price obtains revenue that is no worse than
that of the randomized price.
5.2 Budgets Exceeding Expectation with Constant Probability
We first analyze the approximation bound for anonymous pricing mechanism under the
assumption that the budget exceeds its expectation with constant probability at least 1/κ.
Theorem 5.4. A single private-budget agent is (κ+2, κ+1)-close for price posting if value
and budget are independently distributed, the valuation distribution is regular, and the budget
exceeds its expectation with probability at least 1/κ.
With Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 5.4, Corollary 3.3 implies that under the same assump-
tions in Theorem 5.4, the approximation factor of anonymous pricing is ρ
√
2(κ+ 2)(κ+ 1).
Corollary 5.5. For a single item environment with private-budget agents, anonymous pric-
ing is a ρ
√
2(κ+ 2)(κ+ 1)-approximation to the ex ante relaxation if values and budgets
are independently distributed, the valuation distributions are regular, and the budgets exceed
their expectations with probability at least 1/κ.
We take the following high-level approach which is similar to the analysis of Abrams
(2006). Fix any ex ante constraint q less than 1/(κ+ 1). Consider the per-unit price induces
ex ante allocation probability exactly q; henceforth, the market clearing price. For any
allocation and payment (x, p) obtained by an agent in the ex ante optimal mechanism, refer
to the agent’s per-unit price as p˜ = p/x. We decompose the q ex ante optimal mechanism
into two mechanisms where the per-unit price in the first mechanism for each type is at most
the market clearing price, and the per-unit price in the second mechanism for each type is
at least the market clearing price. The revenue of the former mechanism is smaller than the
revenue of posting the market clearing price since it sells less of the item and with a lower
per-unit price and, under our assumptions, the revenue of the latter can be bounded within
a constant factor of the revenue of posting the market clearing price. The latter analysis
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considers separately the case of high and low market clearing prices, and in the former derives
bounds via the geometry of revenue curves and in the latter by the assumption on budgets.
In order to decompose the ex ante optimal mechanism, we first provide a definition and
a characterization of all incentive compatible mechanisms for a single agent with private-
budget utility, and her behavior in the mechanisms.
Definition 5.1. An allocation-payment function τ : [0, 1] → R+ is a mapping from the
allocation x purchased by an agent to the payment p she is charged.
Lemma 5.6. For a single private-budget agent, any incentive compatible mechanism, and all
types with any fixed budget; the mechanism provides a convex and non-decreasing allocation-
payment function, and subject to this allocation-payment function, each type will purchase
as much as she wants until the budget constraint binds, the unit-demand constraint binds, or
the value binds (i.e., her marginal utility becomes zero).
The formal proof of Lemma 5.6 is given in Appendix B. At a high level, in private budget
settings, by relaxing the incentive compatibility constraint for both values and budgets to
the incentive compatibility constraint only for values, the payment identity at every fixed
budget level is sufficient to induce an allocation-payment function for all types with that
fixed budget.
Fix an arbitrary ex ante constraint q and denoting EX be the q ex ante optimal mecha-
nism. Consider the decomposition of EX into two mechanisms EX† and EX‡. These decom-
posed mechanisms will be incentive compatible for values, but not necessarily for budgets; a
setting we refer to as the random-public-budget utility model. We require that (a) the per-
unit prices in EX† for all types are at most the market clearing price; (b) the allocation for all
types in EX† is at most the allocation in EX; (c) the per-unit prices in EX‡ for all types are
larger than the market clearing price; and (d) the revenue from EX (for a private-budgeted
agent) is upper bounded by the revenue from EX† and EX‡ (for a random-public-budgeted
agent with same distribution), i.e., Rev[EX] ≤ Rev[EX†]+Rev[EX‡].
The construction is as follows: For each budget w, let τw be the allocation-payment
function for types with budget w in mechanism EX, and x∗w be the largest allocation such that
the marginal price is below the market clearing price pq, i.e., x∗w = argmax{x : τ ′w(x) ≤ pq}.
Define the allocation-payment functions τ †w and τ
‡
w for EX
† and EX‡ respectively below,
τ †w(x) =
{
τw(x) if x ≤ x∗w,
∞ otherwise; τ
‡
w(x) =
{
τw(x
∗
w + x)− τw(x∗w) if x ≤ 1− x∗w,
∞ otherwise.
In this construction, since the original allocation-payment functions τw in EX are convex
and non-decreasing for each budget level w, the constructed allocation-payment functions
τ †w and τ
‡
w are also convex and non-decreasing. Hence, for each type, the payment in EX is
upper bounded by the sum of the payments in EX† and EX‡, and the requirements above
are satisfied.
Lemma 5.7. For a single agent with random-public-budget utility, independently distributed
value and budget, and any ex ante constraint q; the revenue of EX† is at most the revenue
from posting the market clearing price, i.e., P (q) ≥ Rev[EX†].
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Figure 4: Depicted are allocation-payment function decomposition. The black lines in both
figures are the allocation-payment function τw in ex ante optimal mechanism EX; the gray
dashed lines are the allocation-payment function τ †w and τ
‡
w in EX
† and EX‡, respectively.
Proof. The ex ante allocation of EX† is at most the ex ante allocation of EX, i.e., q. Com-
bining with the fact that the per-unit prices in EX† for all types are weakly lower than
the market clearing price, its revenue is at most the revenue of posting the market clearing
price.
Now, we introduce two lemmas Lemma 5.8 and Lemma 5.9 to upper bound the revenue
of EX‡; the former for the case that the market clearing price is large, and the latter for
the case that it is small. At a high level, when the market clearing price is large, we utilize
the geometry of revenue curves to bound the revenue; and when the market clearing price is
small, we use the assumption on the budget distribution to bound the revenue.
Lemma 5.8 (Large Market Clearing Prices). For a single agent with random-public-budget
utility, independently distributed value and budget, and a regular valuation distribution:
(i) for any ex ante constraint q and market clearing price pq which is at least the monopoly
reserve m∗, i.e., pq = P (q)/q ≥ m∗, the revenue of posting the market clearing price is
at least the revenue of EX‡, i.e., P (q) ≥ Rev[EX‡];
(ii) (otherwise) for any ex ante constraint q and market clearing price pq = P (q)/q ≥
V (θ) for some θ, the revenue of posting the market clearing price is an (1/(1− θ))-
approximation to the revenue of EX‡, i.e., P (q) ≥ (1− θ) ·Rev[EX‡].
Note that the third case, where the market clearing price is small, will be handled sub-
sequently by Lemma 5.9.
Proof of Lemma 5.8. In both EX‡ and the mechanism that posts the market clearing price,
the types with value lower than the market clearing price pq will purchase nothing, so we
only consider the types with value at least pq in this proof. Each budget level is consid-
ered separately. If a β-approximation is shown separately, then β-approximation holds in
combination.
For types with budget w ≤ pq, by posting the market clearing price pq, those types always
pay their budgets w, which is at least the revenue from those types in EX‡.
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For types with budget w > pq, by posting the market clearing price pq, those types always
pay pq. Since the budget constraints do not bind for these types, it is helpful to consider the
price-posting revenue curve without budget, which we denote by PL. The regularity of the
valuation distribution guarantees that PL is concave. Now we consider two cases: (i) the
market clearing price pq is at least the monopoly reserve m∗; (ii) the market clearing price pq
is less than the monopoly reserve m∗ but at least V (θ). In both cases, we use the concavity
of PL.
For case (i), the concavity of PL implies that higher prices above m∗ extracts lower
revenue than pq. Since the per-unit prices in EX‡ for all types are at least pq, the concavity
of PL guarantees that the expected revenue of posting pq for types with budget larger than
p is at least the expected revenue for those types in EX‡.
For case (ii), the concavity of PL implies that lower prices below m∗ extracts lower
revenue. Thus, posting pq extracts higher revenue than posting V (θ). Again, the concavity
of PL guarantees that the revenue of posting V (θ) is an (1/(1− θ))-approximation to the
optimal revenue (i.e., posting the monopoly reserve m∗) generated from these types, even
with the relaxation of ignoring their budget constraint.
Combining these bounds above, if the market clearing price pq is at least the monopoly
reserve m∗, then P (q) ≥ Rev[EX‡]; and otherwise if the market clearing price pq is at least
V (θ), then P (q) ≥ (1− θ) ·Rev[EX‡].
Lemma 5.9 (Small Market Clearing Prices). For a single agent with random-public-budget
utility, independently distributed value and budget, and a budget distribution such that the
budget exceeds its expectation with probability at least 1/κ, for any ex ante constraint q ≤ θ/κ
with market clearing price pq = P (q)/q < V (θ), the revenue of posting the market clearing
price pq is a (1 + κ − 1/κ)-approximation to the revenue of EX‡, i.e., (1 + κ − 1/κ) · P (q) ≥
Rev
[
EX‡
]
Before the proof of Lemma 5.9, we introduce an intermediate lemma used in our argu-
ment.
Lemma 5.10. Fix any convex and non-decreasing allocation-payment function, and any
value v, for any budgets w† and w‡ such that w† ≤ w‡, subject to this allocation-payment func-
tion, the payment from the type (v, w†) with value v and budget w† is a (w‡/w†)-approximation
to the payment from the type (v, w‡) with value v and budget w‡.
Proof. If the type (v, w†) pays her budget w† (i.e., the budget constraint binds), her payment
is a (w‡/w†)-approximation to the payment from the type (v, w‡), since the type (v, w‡) pays
at most w‡.
If the type (v, w†) pays less than her budget w (i.e., the unit-demand constraint binds,
or the value binds), her allocation is equal to the allocation from the type (v, w‡). Hence,
their payments are the same.
Proof of Lemma 5.9. Similar to the proof of Lemma 5.8, we only consider the types with
value at least pq. Let w∗ be the expected budget. We claim that all types with budget w∗
pay their budget in posting the market clearing price. Otherwise, the unit-demand constraint
binds for all types (v, w) such that v ≥ pq, w ≥ w∗; and the assumption that pq < V (θ)
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implies the ex ante allocation for them is Pr[v ≥ pq] · Pr[w ≥ w∗] > θ/κ, which exceeds the
ex ante constraint q, a contradiction.
Let Revw′
[
τ ‡w
]
be the expected revenue of providing the allocation-payment function τ ‡w
in EX‡ to the types with budget w′; and let Revw′[pq] be the expected revenue of posting
the market clearing price pq to the types with budget w′.
The following three facts allow comparison of Rev
[
EX‡
]
to P (q): (a) Posting the market
clearing price pq makes the budget constraints bind for the types with budget at most
w∗, so Revw
[
τ ‡w
] ≤ Revw[pq] for all w ≤ w∗. (b) Lemma 5.10 implies that Revw[τ ‡w] ≤
w
w∗
Revw∗
[
τ ‡w
]
for all w ≥ w∗. (c) Since the revenue of posting the market clearing price pq
to an agent with budget w∗ is at most the revenue to an agent with budget w > w∗; with the
assumption that budgets exceed the expectation w∗ with probability at least 1/κ, it implies
that
Revw∗[p
q] · 1
κ
≤ E
[
Revw[p
q]
∣∣∣ w ≥ w∗] ·Pr[w ≥ w∗] ≤ P (q).
We upper bound the revenue of EX‡ as follows,
Rev
[
EX‡
]
=
∫ w∗
¯
w
Revw
[
τ ‡w
]
dG(w) +
∫ w¯
w∗
Revw
[
τ ‡w
]
dG(w)
≤
∫ w∗
¯
w
Revw[p
q] dG(w) +
∫ w¯
w∗
w
w∗
Revw∗
[
τ ‡w
]
dG(w)
≤ (1− 1
κ
)P (q) +
∫ w¯
w∗
wdG(w)
w∗
Revw∗ [p
q]
≤ (1− 1
κ
)P (q) +Revw∗[p
q] ≤ (1 + κ− 1
κ
)P (q)
where the first inequality is due to facts (a) and (b); in the second inequality, the first term
is due to Pr[w ≤ w∗] ≤ 1 − 1/κ, the revenue Revw[pq] is monotone increasing in w, and by
definition
∫ w¯
¯
w
Revw[p
q] dG(w) = P (q), and the second term is due to fact (a); and the last
inequality is due to fact (c).
We combine the three lemmas into a proof for Theorem 5.4.
Proof of Theorem 5.4. Set the parameter θ = κ/(κ+ 1). Lemma 5.7, Lemma 5.8 and Lemma 5.9
implies that for all ex ante constraints q ≤ 1/(κ+ 1), the price posting revenue is a (2 + κ)-
approximation to the ex ante revenue.
5.3 MHR Budget Distributions
Assuming that the value and the budget are independently distributed, the valuation distri-
bution is regular, and the budget distribution is MHR, the price-posting revenue curve is con-
cave. This result is formally stated in Lemma 5.11, whose proof is deferred to Appendix B.
Due to the concavity of the price-posting revenue curve, we show a better approximation
bound for anonymous pricing using the reduction in Theorem 3.4.
Lemma 5.11. A single private-budget agent has a concave price-posting revenue curve P if
her value and budget are independently distributed, the valuation distribution is regular, and
the budget distribution is MHR.
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Figure 5: In the geometric proof of Lemma 5.14, the upper bound on the expected revenue
of EX‡ (Revw[pq] and Revw[OPTw] on the left and right, respectively) is the area of the
light gray striped rectangle and the revenue from posting random price pˆ is the area of the
dark gray region. By geometry, the latter is at least half of the former. The black curve is
the price-posting revenue curve with no budget constraint PL. The figure on the left depicts
the small-budget case (i.e., w < pq), and the figure on the right depicts the large-budget case
(i.e., w ≥ pq).
Theorem 5.12. A private-budget agent is 3-close for ex ante optimization if her value and
budget are independently distributed, the valuation distribution is regular, and the budget
distribution is MHR.
Corollary 5.13. For a single item environment with private-budget agents, anonymous pric-
ing is a 3ρ-approximation to the ex ante relaxation if values and budgets are independently
distributed, the valuation distributions are regular, and the budget distributions are MHR.
When the market clearing price is larger than the monopoly reserve, Lemma 5.7 and
Lemma 5.8 guarantees that posting the market clearing price is a 2-approximation to EX.
In this subsection, we improve the approximation guarantee in other case where the market
clearing price is smaller than the monopoly reserve. This improvement is due to the fact
that closeness for ex ante optimization is a weaker condition than closeness for price posting,
which allows us to consider posting any price at least the market clearing price, i.e., the ex
ante constraint does not need to bind. Specifically, we will use the technique from Lemma 5.3
which considers a random per-unit price drawn from the valuation distribution; however, if
the realization of the random price is smaller than the the market clearing price, to satisfy
the ex ante constraint, we replace it with the market clearing price.
The proof for small market clearing prices based on the decomposition from the previous
subsection. Fix any ex ante constraint q, we decompose the ex ante mechanism EX into EX†
and EX‡ where the per-unit prices in EX† for all types are at most the market clearing price
and the per-unit prices in EX‡ for all types are larger than the market clearing price; and
then we upper bound the revenue of EX† and EX‡. For EX† the previously proved bounds
are sufficient; the following lemma improves the bound for EX‡.
Lemma 5.14. For a single private-budget agent with independently distributed value and
budget and regular value distribution, if the market clearing price pq = P (q)/q is smaller than
the monopoly reserve, there exists q† ≤ q such that the market clearing revenue from q† is a
2-approximation to the revenue from EX‡, i.e., 2P (q†) ≥ Rev[EX‡].
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Proof. Note that any price that is at least pq is feasible for the ex ante constraint q. We
consider posting a random price pˆ = max{pq, pˆ0} with pˆ0 drawn identically to the agents value
distribution. Fixing the budget of the agent w, consider the following geometric argument (cf.
Dhangwatnotai et al., 2010). For both sides of Figure 5, the area of the light gray stripped
rectangle upper bounds the revenue of EX‡ and the area of the dark gray region is the
expected revenue from posting random price pˆ. Consequently, concavity of the price-posting
revenue curve with no budget constraint PL (by regularity of the value distribution) implies
that a triangle with half the area of the light gray rectangle is contained within the dark
gray region and, thus, the random price is a 2-approximation. As the random price does not
depend on the budget w, the same bound holds when w is random. Of course, the optimal
deterministic price that is at least pq is only better than the random price and the lemma
is shown. The remainder of this proof verifies that the geometry of the regions described
above is correct.
The left side of Figure 5 depicts the fixed budgets w that are at most pq. The area of
the light gray striped rectangle upper bounds the revenue of EX‡ as follows. Let Revw[p]
be the expected revenue from posting price p to types with budget w. Under both EX‡
and the market clearing price pq, types with value below the market clearing price pay zero.
For the remaining types, in EX‡ they pay at most their budget and in market clearing they
pay exactly their budget. Thus, Revw
[
EX‡
] ≤ Revw[pq] = w (1 − F (pq)) where, recall,
1 − F (pq) is the probability the agent’s value is at least the market clearing price pq. Of
course, w (1 − F (pq)) is the height and area (its width is 1) of the light gray striped region
on the left side of Figure 5.
The right side of Figure 5 depicts the fixed budgets w that are at least pq. The area of
the light gray striped rectangle upper bounds the revenue of EX‡ as follows. Let OPTw be
the optimal mechanism to types with budget w without ex ante constraint and Revw[OPTw]
be its expected revenue from these types. Clearly, Revw
[
EX‡
] ≤ Revw[OPTw] as the latter
optimizes with relaxed constraints of the former. Lemma 5.2 implies that OPTw posts the
minimum between budget w and the monopoly reserve m∗. As the budget does not bind for
this price, its revenue is given by the price-posting revenue curve with no budget constraint,
i.e., Revw[OPTw] = P
L(1−F (min{w,m∗})). Of course, this revenue is the height and area
(its width is 1) of the light gray striped region on the right side of Figure 5.
Next, we will show that the revenue of posting the random price pˆ is the grey shaded
areas illustrated in Figure 5 (in both cases). A random price from the value distribution,
i.e., pˆ0, corresponds to a uniform random quantile constraint, i.e., drawing uniformly from
the horizontal axis. Since we truncate the lower end of the price distribution at the market
clearing price pq, the revenue from quantiles greater than q equals the revenue from the
market clearing price. For any fixed w, when pˆ ∈ [pq, w], the budget does not bind and
the revenue of posting price pˆ is PL(qˆ) where PL is the price-posting revenue curve without
budget; and when pˆ > w, the revenue of posting price pˆ is wqˆ. Thus, the revenue from a
random price is given by the integral of the area under the curve defined by qˆw when pˆ ≥ w,
by PL(qˆ) when pˆ ∈ [w, pq] and this interval exists, and by min(w, pq) when pˆ = pq, i.e., when
pˆ0 ≤ pq. This area is the dark gray region.
Proof of Theorem 5.12. Fix any ex ante constraint q. If the market clearing price pq = P (q)/q
is at least the monopoly reserve, Lemma 5.7 and Lemma 5.8 imply that Rev
[
EX†
] ≤ P (q),
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and Rev
[
EX‡
] ≤ P (q), thus, P (q) is a 2-approximation to Rev[EX†] + Rev[EX†] =
Rev[EX], i.e., R(q). If the market clearing price pq is smaller than the monopoly reserve, let
q† = argmaxq′≤q P (q
′), Lemma 5.7 and Lemma 5.14 imply that Rev
[
EX†
] ≤ P (q) ≤ P (q†),
and Rev
[
EX‡
] ≤ 2P (q†), thus, P (q†) is a 3-approximation to R(q). Thus, the agent is
3-close for ex ante optimization.
6 Risk Averse Utility
In this section, we consider the case when agents are risk averse. Specifically, we consider
the risk aversion model in Fu et al. (2013), where each agent’s utility function has a capacity
constraint. Moreover, following Fu et al. (2013), in this section, we consider the mechanisms
that are pointwise individual rational, i.e., losers have no payment, and winners pay at
most their reported values. Formally, x = 0 implies p = 0. In Example 6.3 at the end
of this section, we show that price-posting mechanism is not a constant approximation to
the optimal mechanism when we allow the winners to be charged more than their reported
values, even when the capacity is as large as the support of the value.
We introduce a definition and two lemmas, which are adapted from Fu et al. (2013). Let
(·)+ = max{·, 0}.
Definition 6.1 (Fu et al., 2013). A mechanism is a two priced mechanism if, when it serves
an agent with quantile q and capacity C, the payment is either V (q) or V (q) − C. The
probability that agent is charged with payment V (q) is denoted by xv(q), and the probability
that agent is charged with payment V (q)− C is denoted by xC(q).
Lemma 6.1 (Fu et al., 2013). The ex ante optimal mechanism for agents with capacitated
utility is two priced.
Lemma 6.2 (Fu et al., 2013). For any agent with capacity C and price-posting revenue
curve P , for two priced mechanism with allocation rule x(q) = xv(q) + xC(q), the revenue
from that agent is upper bounded as
Rev[x] ≤ E[(P ′(q))+ · x(q)]+ E[(P ′(q))+ · xC(q)]+ E[(V (q)− C)+ · xC(q)] .
Theorem 6.3. For a single agent with maximum value v¯ and capacity C ≤ v¯, if her price-
posting revenue curve P is concave, she is (2 + ln v¯/C)-close for ex ante optimization.
Proof. For any quantile qˆ, let x be the optimal allocation that satisfies ex ante allocation
constraint qˆ. By Lemma 6.2,
R(qˆ) = Rev[x] ≤ E[(P ′(q))+ · x(q)]+ E[(P ′(q))+ · xC(q)]+ E[(V (q)− C)+ · xC(q)] .
Let m∗ be the monopoly reserve, and let q† = min{Q(m∗, P ), qˆ}. By definition, q† ≤ qˆ.
Since the price-posting revenue curve is concave, posting price V (q†) maximizes expected
marginal revenue under ex ante constraint qˆ. Therefore,
E
[
(P ′(q))+ · x(q)] ≤ P (q†)
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and
E
[
(P ′(q))+ · xC(q)] ≤ P (q†).
When q† = Q(m∗, P ), for any quantile q, P (q) ≤ P (q†). When q† = qˆ < Q(m∗, P ), the
allocation xC(q) with ex ante constraint qˆ that maximizes E
[
(V (q)− C)+ · xC(q)] satisfies
that xC(q) = 1 for q ≤ q†, and xC(q) = 0 for q > q†. Since the price-posting revenue curve
is concave, in this case, P (q) ≤ P (q†) when q ≤ q†. Therefore,
E
[
(V (q)− C)+ · xC(q)] = E
[(
P (q)
q
− C
)+
· xC(q)
]
≤ E
[(
min
{
v¯,
P (q†)
q
}
− C
)+]
=
∫ min{1,P (q†)
C
}
P (q†)
v¯
(
P (q†)
q
− C
)
dq +
∫ 1
P (q†)
v¯
(v¯ − C)dq
≤ P (q†) ln v¯
C
.
Combining the above inequalities, we have R(q) ≤ P (q†)(2 + ln v¯
C
).
When the agent’s value distribution is regular, her price-posting revenue curve is concave.
By applying Corollary 3.5 and Lemma 3.6, we have the following result.
Corollary 6.4. For a single item environment where each agent i has capacity Ci, and regu-
lar valuation distributions, letting
¯
C = mini(Ci) be the minimum capacity, the approximation
factor of anonymous pricing to the ex ante relaxation is at most (2 + ln v¯/
¯
C)ρ.
In Corollary 6.4, the dependence on ln v¯/
¯
C is necessary even when there is a single agent.
Example 6.2 (necessity of the dependence on v¯/
¯
C). Fix a constant v¯. Consider a single
agent with equal revenue distribution. That is, her value v is drawn from [1, v¯] with a density
function 1/v2 for v ∈ [1, v¯), and a mass point of probability 1/¯v on value v¯. The revenue
for posting any price is 1. Suppose the agent has capacity constraint C ≥ 1, Consider the
mechanism that always allocates the item to the agent, and charges her 0 if her value v is
less than C, and charges her v−C if her value is at least C. The revenue for this mechanism
is ln v¯/C.
Example 6.3 (necessity of the restriction to pointwise individually rational mechanisms).
Fix a constant v¯. Consider a single agent with equal revenue distribution as in Example 6.2.
The revenue for posting any price is 1. Suppose the agent has capacity constraint C = v¯
and consider the mechanism that always allocates the item to the agent, and charges her
v − v¯ with probability 1
2
, v¯ with probability 1
2
. This mechanism is incentive compatible and
individually rational. The revenue for this mechanism is half of the welfare, which cannot be
approximated within a constant fraction by any price-posting mechanism.
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7 Conclusions
In this paper we focused on the approximation bounds for anonymous pricing in single
item environments. We introduce a generalization of regularity which characterizes the gap
between the price-posting revenue curve and the ex ante revenue curve. This generalization
enable a reduction framework to approximately reduce the analysis of the approximation
bound for anonymous pricing for agents with non-linear utility to that of agents with linear
utility. We believe this generalization can be applied for the analysis of a broader class of
mechanisms. For instance, the revenue guarantee of the sequential posted price mechanism
is an interesting direction to apply the approach.
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Appendix
A Motivation of Assumptions for Private Budget
In this section, we use two examples to demonstrate our assumption in Section 5 are reason-
able. In both examples where either the independence between values and budgets or the
constant quantile guarantee for the expected budget fails, while other assumptions hold, the
anonymous pricing is not a constant approximation to the optimal revenue.
Example A.1 (necessity of the independence between the value and budget distributions).
Fix a large constant h. Consider a single agent with value v drawn from [1, h] with density
function h
h−1
1
v2
, and budget w = 2h − v, i.e., her value and budget are fully correlated. A
mechanism which charges the agent v − 2ǫ with probability 1 − ǫ
h
, or w with probability ǫ
h
for sufficient small positive ǫ is incentive compatible and has revenue O(lnh). However, the
revenue of the anonymous pricing is O(1).
Example A.2 (necessity of the constant quantile of the expected budget). Fix a large
constant κ. Consider the case with n =
√
κ agents. For each player i ∈ [n], set her valuation
vi = i with probability 1, and wealth wi = i with probability
1
i2
and wi = 0 with probability
1 − 1
i2
. For each agent, the probability her budget exceeds its expectation is at least 1/κ.
The revenue of sequential posted-pricing, (cf. Chawla et al., 2010), is O(lnκ). However, the
revenue of the anonymous pricing is O(1).
In Example A.2, the price-posting revenue curve for agent i is Pi(q) = q · i if q ≤ 1i2 and
Pi(q) = 0 otherwise, which is non-concave, and the ratio between the ex ante revenue and
the price-posting revenue is infinity after quantile 1
i2
. Moreover, Example A.2 indicates that
under the assumption that for each agent, the probability her budget exceeds its expectation
is at least 1/κ, the lower bound on the approximation ratio of anonymous pricing to the
optimal revenue is Ω(ln κ).
B Omitted Proofs in Section 5
In this section, we give the omitted proofs for Lemma 5.6 and Lemma 5.11 in Section 5.
Omitted Proofs for Lemma 5.6.
Lemma 5.6. For a single agent with private-budget utility, in any incentive compatible
mechanism, for all types with any fixed budget, the mechanism provides a convex and non-
decreasing allocation-payment function, and subject to this allocation-payment function, each
type will purchase as much as she wants until the budget constraint binds, or the unit-demand
constraint binds, or the value binds (i.e., her marginal utility becomes zero).
Proof. Myerson (1981) show that any mechanisms (x, p) for a single agent with linear utility
is incentive compatible (the agent does not prefer to misreport her value) if and only if a) x(v)
is non-decreasing; b) p(v) = vx(v)− ∫ v
0
x(t)dt. Thus, given any non-decreasing allocation x,
the payment p is uniquely pined down by the incentive constraints.
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Comparing with the linear utility, the incentive compatibility in the private-budget utility
guarantees that the agent does not prefer to misreport either her value or budget. If we relax
the incentive constraints such that she is only allowed to misreport her value, Myerson result
already shows that for any fixed budget level w, the allocation x(v, w) is non-decreasing in
v and the payment p(v, w) = vx(v, w) − ∫ v
0
x(t, w)dt is uniquely pined down. We define
the allocation-payment function τw(xˆ) = max{p(v, w) + v · (xˆ − x(v, w)) : x(v, w) ≤ xˆ} if
xˆ ≤ x(v¯, w); and ∞ otherwise. Given the characterization of allocation and payment above,
this allocation-payment function is well-defined, non-decreasing and convex.
Remark B.1. Unlike Myerson’s result which give a sufficient and necessary condition for
incentive compatible mechanisms for agents with linear utility, Lemma 5.6 only characterizes
a necessary condition for private-budget utility. This condition is already enough for our
arguments in Section 5.
Omitted Proofs for Lemma 5.11.
Lemma 5.11. A single agent with private-budget utility has a concave price-posting revenue
curve P if her value and budget are independently distributed, the valuation distribution is
regular, and the budget distribution is MHR.
Proof. Fixing any unit price p ∈ [0, v¯], the ex ante allocation q and the expected price-posting
revenue P for posting price p are
q =
1
p
(
(1−G(p)) p +
∫ p
0
wdG(w)
)
(1− F (p))
P =
(
(1−G(p))p+
∫ p
0
wdG(w)
)
(1− F (p)).
For notation simplicity, we let ∆(p) = (1−G(p))p+ ∫ p
0
wdG(w). To check the concavity of
the price-posting revenue curve, it is sufficient to show that ∂P
∂q∂q
≤ 0.
∂q
∂p
= −1
p
∆(p)f(p) +
1
p
(1−G(p))(1− F (p))− 1
p2
∆(p)(1− F (p)),
∂P
∂p
= (1−G(p))(1− F (p))−∆(p)f(p).
The assumption that the valuation distribution F has positive density on [0, v¯] implies that
∂q
∂p
< 0. Thus,
∂P
∂q
=
∂P
∂p
· ∂p
∂q
=
p2(1−G(p))(1− F (p))− p2∆(p)f(p)
p(1−G(p))(1− F (p))− p∆(p)f(p)−∆(p)(1− F (p)) .
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Since ∂q
∂p
< 0, to show ∂P
∂q∂q
≤ 0, it is sufficient to show ∂
∂p
∂P
∂q
≥ 0. Let ψ(p) and φ(p) be the
numerator and denominator of ∂P
∂q
, then ∂
∂p
∂P
∂q
≥ 0 is equivalent to ψ′(p)φ(p)−ψ(p)φ′(p) ≥ 0.
ψ′(p) = 2p(1−G(p))(1− F (p))− p2g(p)(1− F (p))− p2(1−G(p))f(p)
− 2p∆(p)f(p)− p2(1−G(p))f(p)− p2∆(p)f ′(p),
φ′(p) = (1−G(p))(1− F (p))− pg(p)(1− F (p))− p(1−G(p))f(p)
−∆(p)f(p)− p(1−G(p))f(p)− p∆(p)f ′(p)
− (1−G(p))(1− F (p)) +∆(p)f(p).
Thus, 1
p
(ψ′(p)φ(p)− ψ(p)φ′(p)) equals
2∆(p)f(p)(1− F (p))(∆(p)− (1−G(p))p)
+∆2(p)p(2f 2(p) + (1− F (p))f ′(p))
+ (1− F (p))2(∆(p)g(p)p− 2(1−G(p))(∆(p)− (1−G(p))p))
where the first term is always non-negative and the second term is non-negative since F is
a regular distribution. For the last term, when g(p) = 0, by the MHR assumption for the
budget distribution, G(p) = 0 or G(p) = 1. In both cases, the last term is 0. Hence, we only
need to check that when g(p) 6= 0, the last term is equivalent to
∆(p)p− 21−G(p)
g(p)
(∆(p)− (1−G(p))p) ≥ 0
Notice that the left hand side is zero when p =
¯
w, and some non-negative value when p = w¯.
Therefore, it is sufficient to show that the left hand side is monotone non-decreasing. Taking
the derivative, it become
(
3 + 2(1−G(p)) g′(p)
g2(p)
)
(∆(p)− (1−G(p))p), which is non-negative
since the budget distribution G is MHR.
C Tightness of Reduction Framework
Lemma C.1. For any α, β ≥ 1 and η = α, there exists {Pi}ni=1 and {Ri}ni=1 such that for
each agent i, her price-posting revenue curve Pi is (α, β)-close for price posting to her ex ante
revenue curve Ri, the optimal price posting revenue for each agent is an η-approximation to
the optimal single agent revenue, and anonymous pricing on the price posting revenue curve
is at most an
(
e
2(e−1) ·
√
αβη
)
-approximation to anonymous pricing on the ex ante revenue
curve, i.e., e
2(e−1) ·
√
αβη · AP({Pi}ni=1) ≤ AP({Ri}ni=1).
Proof. Consider an instance with n =
√
β agents. For each agent i, her price posting revenue
curve Pi and her ex ante revenue curve Ri are illustrated in Figure 6.
In this case, the optimal anonymous pricing on the ex ante revenue curve is to post
effective price p = αβ. The probability the item is sold is 1 − (1 − 1/√β)
√
β ≥ e/(e− 1).
Therefore, AP({Ri}ni=1) ≥ ee−1 · αβ.
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Figure 6: The ex ante revenue curve and the price posting revenue curve for each agent i.
The anonymous pricing revenue on the price posting revenue curve is upper bounded by
the optimal ex ante revenue on the price posting revenue curve. That is,
AP({Pi}ni=1) ≤ EAR({Pi}ni=1) =
n∑
i=1
Pi(
1√
β
) ≤ 2
√
β.
Therefore, AP({Ri}ni=1) ≥ e2(e−1) · α
√
β · AP({Pi}ni=1) = e2(e−1) ·
√
αβη · AP({Pi}ni=1).
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